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Abstract
We use the Vietnam Living Standard Survey conducted in 1993 and in 1998 to analyze the
determinants of private transfers among rural farmers. Private transfers are widespread and im-
portant relative to pre-transfer income levels of recipients in both years. Conducting parametric
and semiparametric analysis of single-index models for transfer status, we ﬁnd that private trans-
fers help smoothing income across the life cycle and across states of nature. Pre-transfer income
is positively related to the net donor status and negatively associated with the net recipients status,
especially for low levels of income. These results suggest that crowding-out of public redistribu-
tive policies targeted to the rural poor might be an issue to take into account in Vietnam.
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1 Introduction
Analyzing inter-household private transfers in developing countries matters because these transfers
can act as partial substitutes for weak public transfers or for the absence of adequate market insti-
tutions designed to pool idiosyncratic risk. More speciﬁcally, the transfer response to changes in
income is of primary interest since it has important consequences for the design of public redistri-
bution policies. If inter-household private transfers are very responsive to income, the redistributive
effect of government policies could be weakened due to ”crowding-out” effects.
The possibility that public transfers could crowd-out existing private transfers was ﬁrst suggested
by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974). In subsequent theoretical work, the inﬂow of private transfers
was modeled as being either negatively or positively determined by the recipient’s income, depend-
ing on the nature of these private transfers. Cox (1987) shows that if private transfers are altruistic in
nature, or if they follow self-interested risk-sharing arrangements, then the inﬂow of private transfers
should be negatively related with recipients income. If private transfers are driven by exchange mo-
tives though, it is possible that the response of private transfers inﬂow to recipients income becomes
positive.
So far, the existing empirical evidence on developed countries found a very weak, if any, re-
lationship between transfer inﬂow and income. Based on US data, Cox and Jakubson (1995) and
Altonji et al. (1997) estimate transfer derivatives on the order of magnitude of 10 cents for a 1
dollar change in income. One explanation accounting for this low magnitude could be that public
transfers are already sufﬁciently developed in the US, so that private transfers do not respond one
to one to income changes. This is the reason why the empirical literature on private transfers has
recently shifted its attention do developing countries where the public sector is less in the capacity
of managing generalized redistribution transfers.
Cox et al. (2004) analyze inter-household private transfers in the Philippines and they ﬁnd evi-
dence of non-linear effects in the way transfers respond to income. This possible non-linearity in the
transfer response to income can also explain to some extend why previous empirical studies based
on linear speciﬁcations didn’t ﬁnd a strong elasticity of transfers to income. While previous studies
have focused on either one of the three motives underlying private transfers (altruism, exchange or
risk-sharing), Cox et al. (2004) argue that taking into account all three motives together could explain
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the presence of non-linear effects in the transfer function. They found evidence of strong transfer
derivatives, but only among low income households. Their result is consistent with transfers being
determined either by altruism or by risk-sharing considerations. Yang and Choi (2007) also look at
Philippine households but they focus on transfers received from abroad (remittances). Contrarily to
Cox et al. (2004) they adopt a linear speciﬁcation of the transfer function, and they ﬁnd some evi-
dence in support of transfers being driven by risk-sharing arrangements. Finally, Kazianga (2006)
analyzes the transfer behavior of rural households from Burkina Faso, allowing for non-linear ef-
fects in the transfer response to income. His ﬁndings contrast with those of Cox et al. (2004) in that
the transfer response to income is found to be small, and it is smaller for the low income households.
This result implies in turn that as far as Burkina Faso is concerned, crowding out effects from public
transfers may not arise for very low income groups.
In our paper, we use a household survey from Vietnam conducted in 1993 and 1998 to study
the determinants of inter-household private transfers among rural farmers. Cox (2002) gives a de-
scriptive overview of transfer patterns based on the same data-set, highlighting the fact that these
transfers are large and widespread in both years of the survey. Our contribution is to build up on this
descriptive work using regression analysis to examine the scope for potential crowding-out effects in
Vietnam. We use both parametric and semiparametric methods to conduct binary dependent variable
analysis focusing on the probability that a rural farmer is either net receiver or net sender of private
transfers. We ﬁnd that the probability of being a net receiver depends negatively on recipients pre-
transfer income in a non-linear way. The low income group is more likely to receive transfers than
higher income groups. This ﬁnding alone suggest that crowding-out effects from public redistribu-
tion policies might be an issue for the low income group. Furthermore, The probability of being a
net sender of transfers depends positively on pre-transfer income of the sender. Finally the age of
the household’s head is another strong determinants of transfer inﬂows.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conceptual framework for private trans-
fers following Cox (1987) and Cox et al. (2004). The third section describes the data and gives a
ﬁrst account of transfer patterns in rural Vietnam. Empirical methods and results are described in
section 4 and section 5 concludes.
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2 Conceptual Framework
The theoretical literature on private transfers is driven mainly by two lines of work: the altruism vs
exchange dichotomy, and the risk-sharing motive.
2.1 Altruism vs Exchange
The standard analytical framework in the transfer literature is one in which there is a dichotomy
between pure altruism and exchange motives ((Cox, 1987)).
Consider two individuals, a donor d and a recipient r. One-sided altruism from the donor per-
spective is assumed, and the recipient’s utility V enters directly in the donor’s utility function U .
Ud = U (Cd, S, V (Cr, S)) (1)
Cd = Yd − T (2)
Cr = Yr + T (3)
V (Yr + T, S) ≥ V0 (Yr, 0) (4)
S denotes ”services” (in a large sense) that the recipient might deliver to the donor. Cd and Cr
are consumption levels of, respectively, the donor and the recipient, and Yd and Yr are their pre-
transfer income levels. Expressions (2) and (3) are the budget constraints faced by the donor and the
recipient, with T being the amount of transfer taking place from the donor to the recipient. Altruism
is implied by assuming that ∂U∂V > 0, and the exchange motive is also embedded by assuming that
∂V
∂S < 0 and
∂U
∂S > 0. Finally, (4) is a participation constraint specifying that the recipient accepts
receiving the donor’s transfer only if his utility improves over the status quo. Additional necessary
assumptions involve the absence of market substitutes for the services S provided by the recipient,
and the dominating position of the donor in the bargaining arrangement in order to ensure that the
transfer amount T exactly compensates the offered services S.
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When the participation constraint is not binding (V > V0), altruism is the main driving force
behind private transfers. In this is the case Cox (1987) shows that ∂T∂Yr < 0. When the participation
constraint binds however, transfers are driven by exchange motives. In this case, transfers will
ﬁrst rise with Yr for low income levels and then fall with Yr, generating and inverted-U-shaped
relationship.
The work of Cox et al. (2004) with Philippine data, and of Kazianga (2006) with rural households
from Burkina Faso, suggest that the coexistence of altruism and exchange-based motivations behind
transfers can generate non-linearities in the empirical relationship between transfers and income.
In addition to altruism and exchange risk-sharing arrangements can also drive transfers.
2.2 Risk Sharing and Transfers
Becker (1974) already noted that altruistic transfers could imply that effective risk-sharing is taking
place. However, subsequent work on risk sharing showed that altruism is not needed for mutual in-
surance to occur through private transfers. The studies of Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994) for
example suggest that selﬁsh individuals could enter into efﬁcient risk-pooling arrangements taking
place through private transfers or through other means.
In this setup, if risk-sharing takes place through private transfers, it means that transfers inﬂow
will be negatively related to the recipient’s transitory income and similarly, transfer outﬂows will be
positively related to the donor’s transitory income. Moreover, the consequences of a given negative
income shock are often likely to be higher for low income groups, meaning that a higher amount of
transfer is needed to insure households in low income categories.
Hence, whether transfers are motivated by altruism or exchange considerations, or whether they
are the manifestation of informal risk-sharing arrangements taking place between selﬁsh individuals,
the relationship between transfers and income is likely to be non-linear. In the following analysis,
this potential non-linearity will be explicitly taken into account.
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3 Data and Transfer Patterns
This section presents the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) and focuses particularly on trans-
fers and income. Patterns of inter-household private transfers are given at the end of the section.
3.1 The Vietnam Living Standard Survey
The ﬁrst round of the Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS93) was conducted between October
1992 and October 1993. A total of 4,800 households were ﬁrst randomly selected according to a
multistage cluster sampling procedure in order to give a representative picture of the whole country,
based on the 1989 census data. The second round of the survey was conducted between Decem-
ber 1997 and November 1998 (VLSS98). The VLSS98 bears many similarities in design with the
VLSS93, and 4,305 households interviewed during the ﬁrst round of the survey were re-interviewed
in 1998. In addition to these households, the sample size was increased to a total of 5,999 house-
holds. Both surveys were undertaken by the General Statistical Ofﬁce of Vietnam, with the technical
assistance of the World Bank.
Overall, both survey were well designed and conducted. They offer an important source of
reliable information related to the country’s living standards during a period of transition. The sur-
veys were conducted in the aftermath of the ”Doi Moi”, a generic term describing a set of important
reforms taken in 1986 and designed to gear a centrally planned country towards a decentralized mar-
ket economy. Between 1993 and 1998, Vietnam’s GDP rose by 8.9% per year, and the headcount
poverty declined from 58% to 37%.
The questionnaires were based on a standard format used by the World Bank in other Living
Standard Measurement Surveys. Typically, these questionnaires are divided into many components
including household demographics, education, health, employment, agricultural activity, migrations,
consumption, and private transfers.
In this paper we focus on a sub-sample of rural farmer households who participated in both
rounds of the survey. This subsample is composed with 2871 households interviewed in 1993 and
in 1998.
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3.2 Transfers
Sections 12 and 13 in the questionnaires were dedicated to ”assistance send” and ”assistance re-
ceived”. The head of the household was asked: ”during the past 12 months has any member of
your household provided (received) money or goods to (from) persons who are not member of your
household?”. If this question was answered positively, then details were asked at the individual
level concerning the relationship of the donor to the recipient, the monetary value of the transfer and
the geographical origin and destination of the transfer.
Ideally, to analyze transfer relationships, one would need very detailed information from both
the donor and the recipient for every transfers. This is simply not feasible in a survey as large as the
VLSS. What we have here instead is detailed information on either the recipient or the donor.
In this paper, we focus our attention on pure domestic transfers. We do not take into account
borrowing and lending transfers which can occur between an individual and a formal ﬁnancial in-
stitution or (and this is indeed often the case) between an individual and a a private moneylender.
Moreover, we focus on domestic transfers and discard remittances from abroad. We do so because
remittances from abroad involve a minority of farmers in our sample and because the magnitude of
these transfers is much higher than the magnitude of domestic transfers, suggesting that these ﬂows
should be considered separately. Patterns of transfers ares described at the end of this section, but
before we now turn our attention to households income.
3.3 Income
The VLSS does not provide direct calculations of household income, but detailed information on
the sources of income is available and allows us to estimate household real income for the whole
sample in both years. Nominal income is corrected in both years for monthly and regional variations.
Moreover we express income from VLSS93 in 1998 real terms. From the survey information, total
income can be disaggregated into 6 components: (1) income from land payments, (2) income from
agricultural activities, (3) non-farm self-employment income, (4) wage income, and (5) other income
(including public and private transfers). The details concerning these broad income components are
given in Appendix 1.
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Income estimates obtained by aggregating these various components are in line with the esti-
mated total consumption expenditures given by the survey (ﬁgure 1). We focus more speciﬁcally
on pre-transfer income, that is total income plus transfers send to other households minus transfers
received from other households. Annual pre-transfer income and total consumption per capita are
both close to 1500 thousand VND. Between 1993 and 1998 in our sample of farmers, pre-transfer
income grew at an annual rhythm of 9.6% while total consumption per capita grew at an annual rate
of 5.3%.
The structure of income for our sample of farmers is represented in ﬁgure 4 and 5. Not surpris-
ingly, the main component of farmers income is derived from agricultural activities. Figure 2 and
table 1 show the regional repartition of income in 1993 and 19981. Southern regions grew more
rapidly than northern regions2. The highest growth is experienced in the Central Highlands, and this
region deserves some special attention.
The Central Highlands is a region specialized in the production of tea and coffee. These coffee
plantations were the result of a resettlement policy in New Economic Zones promoted by the gov-
ernment after the war. Vietnam became the 4th largest world exporter of coffee in 1998 with 6.5%
of total production, most of which consists in Robusta variety. Coffee currently represents 12% of
Vietnam total exports which is the second highest share behind rice3. Table 2 shows the repartition
and the concentration of coffee producers in our sample. Central Highlands account for 48% of total
coffee production in 1993 and for 60% in 1998. Moreover, 61% of Central Highlands farmers are
coffee producers in 1993, and this proportion rises to 84% in 1998. These coffee producers experi-
enced an important positive price shock between 1993 and 1998. World prices trends for coffee are
pictured in ﬁgure 3. Coffee prices grew more than 150% between 1993 and 1998.
We will see below that most of these coffee producers involved in transfers are in fact net senders
of transfers.
1Income calculations revealed outliers which were excluded from our subsample of farmers (64 households in 1993 and
69 in 1998). In most cases, these are households for which it was not possible to distinguish recurrent production costs from
investment. The resulting sample size is thus 2807 in 1993 and 2802 in 1998
2In the ﬁgures, regions from left to right correspond to regions from north to south.
3See de Fontenay and Leung (2002).
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3.4 Patterns of domestic transfers
Relatively many households in our sample participate in transfers, and the percentage of households
involved in transfers rises between 1993 and 1998 from 23% to 32%. In other words, six years
of sustained economic growth in Vietnam has not diminished the importance of transfers among
Vietnamese farmers, to the contrary. If we look at the regional repartition of these participation rates
(table 4a and 4b), it appears that households from the northern regions, relatively poorer than those
in the south, are more likely to participate in transfers. These two tables also show us that Central
highland farmers are net senders for the most part.
Private transfers are not only widespread, they are also important in magnitude (table 5). The
average transfer amount received represent 7% in 1993 and 10% in 1998 of the average (pre-transfer)
income of all farmers. If we consider now only recipient households, private transfers represent 60%
of income in 1993 and 70% in 1998. Focusing on the whole sample and just on rural farmers, Cox
(2002) reports lower magnitude, even though still important for the receiving households. For the
whole sample, received transfers represent 32% of recipients income in 1993 and 39% in 1998.
Private transfers are also relatively important relatively to the senders income level, amounting to
25% of senders income in 1993 and to 35% in 1998.
If we look now at the direction of transfers, we can say that these take place essentially within
family members from other households. This relative vicinity of transfer partners is however less
important in 1998 compared to 1993. Moreover, contrarily to the evidence reported from developed
economies, transfers in rural Vietnam are more likely to ﬂow from young to old individuals rather
than from old to young.
Finally, table 3 gives us some insights about the characteristics of the net receivers of transfers
compared to the net senders. Consistently with the previous ﬁndings, recipient households heads are
older than donor households heads, and they include relatively more dependent members. Besides,
net givers are relatively richer than net recipients, in terms of pre-transfer income, but also in terms
of wealth.
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4 Empirical Analysis
From the previous section, we saw that private transfers in Vietnam seem to function as family
support means to elderly members, contributing to consumption smoothing across the live cycle.
These transfers also seem to provide support from rich to poor members suggesting also the possible
existence of an insurance motive. Building on the previous descriptive section we now turn our
attention to regression analysis.
The approach adopted here is to use binary dependent variable regression methods to investigate
what are the determinants of transfers status.
4.1 Econometric model
We choose an index function formulation to model the underlying latent variable determining the
observed transfer status for net receivers and for net senders. Let y∗send be this latent unobserved
variable for net senders and y∗rec for net receivers4. The index function model is given by:
y∗rec = Xβ + u (5)
X is anN×K matrix of exogenous explanatory variables for the transfer status binary indicator
and β is aK × 1 vector of parameters, withN observations andK explanatory variables, including
a constant. This equation however cannot be directly estimated as y∗rec is not observed. Instead we
observe the binary variable y such that
y =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if y∗rec > 0
0 if y∗rec ≤ 0
(6)
4We will present only the model for net receivers as both have similar formulations.
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Moreover, we have that
Pr [y = 1 |X ] = Pr [y∗rec > 0] (7)
= Pr [Xβ + u > 0]
= Pr [−u < Xβ ]
= F (Xβ)
where F is the cumulative distribution of −u with F (−u) = F (u) if the density is symmetric
around 0.
We can choose to impose a parametric assumption concerning the distribution of u to this model.
If we assume that u ∼ N (0, 1), then (7) becomes a Probit model with Pr [−u < Xβ ] = Φ(Xβ),
and Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal. The matrix X of explanatory vari-
ables includes household characteristics, permanent income controls (education of head, owned
land surface, value of capital equipment and value of livestock), regional dummies and pre-transfer
income. Quadratic terms for the age of the household head and for pre-transfer income are also
included to allow for non-linear effects.
With this speciﬁcation, some concern may arise regarding the identiﬁcation of β if one explana-
tory variable is correlated with the error term.
4.2 Endogeneity
One could reasonably expect pre-transfer income to be endogenously determined with respect to
transfer status, especially for net receivers. If effort is not perfectly observable and if recipient
households anticipate some transfer for assistance when they report a low annual income, they have
incentives to reduce their effort. As a result annual income would be lower for recipient households
and identiﬁcation of β would be biased.
Correlation between pre-transfer income and the error term u could also arise because of omit-
ted variables or if income is measured with errors and if the measurement error is related to the
dependent variable.
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Our strategy to account for the potential endogeneity of income is to conduct an endogeneity
test. Wooldridge (2001) presents a two-step procedure following Rivers and Vuong (1988) to test
the endogeneity of regressors in a simultaneous probit model. We can rewrite (5) as
y∗rec = Z1δ1 + α1y2 + u1 (8)
y2 = Z1δ21 + Z2δ22 + v2 = Zδ2 + v2 (9)
y = 1 [y∗rec > 0] (10)
where (u1, v2) has a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and is independent of Z. If u1
and v2 are correlated, y2 is endogenous.
In our case, y2 is our measure of pre-transfer income, Z1 are the other explanatory variables, and
Z2 is an instrument for income. We use estimated shocks to the farmers production function as an
instrument for pre-transfer income. The underlying identifying assumption that we are making here
is that these estimated shocks matter for the transfer status only insofar as they matter for income.
4.2.1 Shocks to farmers production function
For the farmers production function, we assume a Cobb-Douglas form given by
log Yit = α +
K∑
k=1
βk logXkit + γϕit +
T∑
t=1
C∑
c=1
λctδct + φi + 	it (11)
where Yit is the real value of household agricultural revenue, Xkit are k inputs to the production
function, and φi is a ﬁxed-effect capturing heterogeneity across households such as unobserved
ability but also time invariant commune characteristics such as soil conditions and other geographic
characteristics inﬂuencing production. δct are commune-year characteristics which are meant to
capture time-varying common conditions or shocks to households production function. 	it is a mean
zero error term which is identically and independently distributed across households. We use νit as
a measure of idiosyncratic shock to the household production function. Input variablesXkit include
cultivated land surface, hired labor expenses, hours worked on farm by the household members, the
value of capital equipment used for production and the value of various input expenditures such
as seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, transport and storage. We also include a measure of technical
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efﬁciency ϕit in the regression, where technical efﬁciency is obtained after estimating a stochastic
frontier production function following Battese and Coelli (1995). In this speciﬁcation, technical
efﬁciency effects are an explicit function of household-speciﬁc variables and are allowed to vary in
time. The stochastic frontier model can be written as
log Yit = α +
K∑
k=1
βk logXkit + (νit − uit) (12)
where Yit, Xkit are as deﬁned earlier, νit ∼ iid
(
0, σ2v
)
and are independent of the uit which are
non-negative random variables accounting for technical efﬁciency in farm production. uit measures
the distance to the efﬁcient stochastic production frontier given by α+
∑K
k=1 βk logXkit + νit. We
assume that uit are independently distributed as truncation at zero of the N
(
mit, σ
2
u
)
distribution,
where
mit = zitδ (13)
where zit are p household-speciﬁc variables inﬂuencing farm efﬁciency. In our case, zit contains
information on the number of crops owned by the household, the age and education of the household
head, and the size and composition of the household. Our estimated measure of technical efﬁciency
to be included in (11) is thus given by
ϕˆit = exp (−uit) (14)
We use the estimated residuals from (11) to construct shock variables for agricultural revenues a
exp(	ˆit)/Yˆit (15)
Figure 6 represents the distribution of these shocks in 1993 and in 1998. The distribution is bell
shaped and centered around zero with most observation belonging to the [−20%;+20%] interval,
with extreme values ranging in [−40%;+40%].
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4.2.2 Two-step endogeneity test
Rivers and Vuong (1988) show that if
(u1, v2) ∼ N
⎛
⎜⎝0,
⎡
⎢⎣ 1 η1
η1 τ
2
2
⎤
⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎠
then we can write u1 = θ1v2 + e1 with θ1 = η1/τ22 and e1 ⊥ Z and v2.
In this case, we have that
Pr [y = 1 |Z, y2, v2 ] =Φ
[
(Z1δ1 + α1y2 + θ1v2) /
(
1− ρ2
1
)1/2]
So observing v2 would allow us to run a probit regression of y∗rec on Z1, y2 and v2 in order to
estimate consistently the scales coefﬁcients δρ1 ≡ δ1/
(
1− ρ2
1
)1/2
, αρ1 ≡ α1/
(
1− ρ2
1
)1/2
, and
θρ1 ≡ θ1/
(
1− ρ2
1
)1/2
However, v2 is not observed, but it can be estimated in a ﬁrst step by running an OLS regression
of y2 on Z1 and Z2. Then we can run a probit regression of y∗rec on Z1, y2 and vˆ2 to estimate
consistently the scaled coefﬁcients δρ1, αρ1 and θρ1. In this second step, the t statistics on the
estimated residual vˆ2 is a valid test of endogeneity withH0 : θ1 = 05.
The results for this two-step procedure are reported in table 6. For both transfer status (net
receiver or net sender), endogeneity is rejected at conventional signiﬁcance level. Therefore, we
continue our analysis assuming that pre-transfer income is not endogenous to transfers status.
4.3 Parametric Analysis
We begin the regression analysis by postulating a speciﬁc functional form for the distribution of
the error term u in (5). More speciﬁcally, we consider two alternative parametric models, a Linear
Probability Model and a Probit model.
5See Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Wooldridge (2001) for more details
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4.3.1 Linear Probability Model
The distributional assumption for the linear probability model imposes that
F (Xβ) ≡ Xβ (16)
The only issue with the linear probability model is that it cannot be an accurate description of the
population response probability E (y = 1 |X ) because it does not restrict the estimated probability
to belong to the [0, 1] interval. However, in most cases, the linear probability models is a useful
approximation. The model is estimated by OLS and the results are reported in table 7a and 8a.
Focusing on the probability of being a net receiver of transfers, the ﬁrst result to note is that the
gender of the household’s head appears as an important determinant of transfer inﬂows. In 1993,
female household heads had 9% more chances to be net receivers of transfers than men, and 5%
more chances in 1998. Most of these household heads are widowed women who receive family
assistance to compensate for the death of the breadwinner.
Beside gender, the age of the household head also matters for net receivers. The probability of
receiving transfers decreases with age as the household’s head lives his productive life. However,
this relation is non-linear, and after a certain age, this probability increases with age. The number
of dependent members in the household, in proportion to working age members, also drives the
probability of receiving transfers up.
Surprisingly, whether households received some form of public assistance or whether they sub-
scribed to a private insurance does not matter for the transfer status of recipients. These are however
a minority of households.
Finally, apart from education, variables related to permanent income such as the surface of
owned land or the value of capital (equipment and livestock) do not affect the probability of re-
ceiving transfers. Once we control for these factors however, the remaining part of our income
measure is and important determinant of transfer inﬂows. Moreover, the probability of being a net
receiver decreases non-monotonically with the level of income, and past a given level it increases
with income.
If we turn now to the transfer outﬂows, we observe opposite effects for income and age. The
probability of being a net donor increases with age up to a threshold level, and it increases similarly
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with transitory income in a non-linear way. Contrarily to the previous case however, some per-
manent income characteristics now matter with respect to the transfer status for donors. Wealthier
households are more likely to send transfers.
4.3.2 Probit Model
We consider now an alternative distribution function by assuming that the error term u is normally
distributed:
F (Xβ) ≡ Φ(Xβ) ≡
∫ Xβ
−∞
φ (x) dx
with φ (x) = (2π)−1/2 exp
(
−x2/2
)
which is the standard normal density function. This model
is estimated by maximum likelihood and the results are given in table 7a and 8b.
Probit estimates are qualitatively very similar to those obtained with the linear probability model.
The coefﬁcient for the age of the head in 1998 is only short of being signiﬁcant at conventional
conﬁdence level (p = 0.12).
Figure 7 plots the predicted probabilities of being a net receiver against pre-transfer income and
age. The red lines represent the probit predictions holding all variables at their mean value, except
for income and for age. In both years, the predicted probability of being a recipient is much higher at
low levels of income, and it falls relatively quickly as income increases. This predicted probability
then rises again for the few very rich observations in our sample. This picture is consistent with
transfers being driven by altruism or risk-sharing motives at low level of income.
The predicted probabilities plotted against the age of the household head are also relatively
higher for older heads.
Looking now at net donors, the estimates obtained from the probit model are also very similar
to the linear model estimates. The probability of sending transfers increases non-linearly with pre-
transfer income and with age. The fact that households are more likely to be net donors as the
transitory component of income increases is also consistent with transfers being driven in part by
risk-sharing considerations.
4.4 Semiparametric Analysis
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Consistency of estimates for binary dependent variable models depends crucially on the validity of
the distributional assumption. If errors are normally distributed, then the probit model is the most
efﬁcient estimator. On the contrary, if this normality assumption is not true, then the probit estimates
are not consistent. In reality, we don’t know whether errors are normally distributed or not. To check
the robustness of our previous ﬁndings, we choose to conduct semiparametric analysis of the transfer
response to income.
Semiparametric methods to estimate single-index models are relatively less efﬁcient than para-
metric methods, but the results are robust to failures of the distributional assumptions in fully para-
metric models.
Many semiparametric estimators of the single-index model have been proposed6. Klein and
Spady (1993) propose a semiparametric MLE similar in spirit to the WSLS estimator of Ichimura
(1993). Their estimator is however fully efﬁcient in the sense that it attains the semiparametric efﬁ-
ciency bound. The Klein and Spady (1993) estimator maximizes the following likelihood function
L (β |y,X ) =
N∑
i=1
{
yi ln Fˆ (Xiβ) + (1− yi) ln
(
1− Fˆ (Xiβ)
)}
(17)
where Fˆ (Xiβ) is a nonparametric estimator of F (Xiβ). More speciﬁcally, F (Xiβ) is esti-
mated with a local constant kernel estimator using cross-validated bandwidth7. The estimation is
conducted using the np package of R.
The predicted probabilities of being net recipient or net donor are plotted against income and
against age in ﬁgure 9. We can see that for both transfers status, semiparametric predicted probabil-
ities are in line with the parametric results obtained with the probit model. To further assess whether
our results are sensitive to the estimation method we plot the semiparametric predicted probabilities
against the parametric predictions in ﬁgure 10. Except for some outliers, both approaches deliver
predictions in the same ball park. However, the scatter around the 45 degree line increases slightly
when predicted probabilities are high.
To summarize, we found that inter-household private transfers in rural Vietnam serve partly as a
vehicle of life-cycle insurance. This intergenerational insurance is most likely to take place within
family members who do not live in the same household. Active members are most likely to be net
6See for example Manski (1975), Horowitz (1992), Ichimura (1993) or Lewbel (1997).
7See Li and Racine (2006) and Hayﬁeld and Racine (2008) for details.
17
donors, and older retired members are more likely to be net recipients.
These transfers can also protect against major life events such as the death of the household’s
head. Being a female head of household increases the likelihood of being a net recipient of transfers
Finally, transfers also seem to provide some insurance against low income. Controlling for the
permanent determinants of income, the probability of becoming a net donor increases with the level
of pre-transfer income. Moreover, the probability of becoming a net recipient is relatively high for
low levels of income, and it decreases dramatically as the level of income increases.
The shape of the relationship between the transfer status and pre-transfer income for net re-
cipients is consistent with models in which either altruism or risk-sharing are the determinants of
transfers ((Cox, 1987)). Moreover, the positive association between pre-transfer income and the net
donor status would be more easily related to situations where risk-sharing arrangements are executed
through transfers.
As Cox et al. (2004) already suggested it, it is not unlikely that these motives coexist in driving
observed transfers in our rural environment. This juxtaposition of motives also helps to explain why
the relationship between the transfer status and income is non-linear. In the end, what matters for
the design of public policy is less the exact underlying motive behind transfers than the sign and
the magnitude of the transfer response to income. In our case, transfers seem very responsive to
income at low level of pre-transfer income. This elasticity of private transfers to income should be
accounted for if the government seeks to conduct effective redistribution plans targeted towards the
rural poor.
18
5 Conclusion
We have examined the determinants of inter-household private transfers based on a sample of rural
farmers from Vietnam in 1993 and 1998.
Using both fully parametric and semiparametric estimation methods for single index models,
we found that among other factors, the age of the head, the gender of the head and the transitory
component of income are major determinants of transfer inﬂows and outﬂows.
Transfers seem to help smoothing income through the life cycle and across states of nature.
Controlling for permanent income factors, the transitory part of pre-transfer income is positively
related to the donor status and negatively to the recipient status.
These results suggest that potential redistributive public transfers targeted towards the rural poor
may just crowd-out existing private transfers taking place mostly at the family level.
19
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Tables
Table 1: Sample size and pre-transfer income
1993 1998
Size Income Size Income
Whole sample 2807 1509.5 2802 2617.3
North 1757 1405.7 1758 2258.9
South 1050 1683.1 1044 3220.7
North Mountains 540 1288.3 593 2146.6
Red River 744 1611.5 692 2498.0
North Central 473 1216.1 473 2050.0
South Central 295 1095.5 294 2233.9
Central Highland 96 1401.1 94 4384.8
Southeast 161 1752.6 159 3640.4
Mekong River 498 2063.2 497 3450.1
Table 2: Coffee producers
Whole sample farmers
1993 (N = 3770) 1998 (N = 4259)
Repartition Concentration Repartition Concentration
North Mountains 15.1 3.3 3.7 1.7
Red River 11.6 1.7 0.0 0.0
North Central 4.8 1.1 7.1 4.0
South Central 4.1 1.6 0.8 0.6
Central Highlands 43.8 51.6 72.7 71.1
Southeast 17.1 9.5 15.1 13.1
Mekong Delta 3.4 0.7 0.6 0.3
”Repartition” is the % of all coffee producers in each region
”Concentration” is the % of coffee producers among all farmers in each region
Subsample farmers
1993 (N = 2807) 1998 (N = 2802)
Repartition Concentration Repartition Concentration
North Mountains 12.9 3.0 9.7 2.2
Red River 12.9 2.1 0.0 0.0
North Central 4.8 1.3 16.4 4.6
South Central 4.8 2.0 2.2 1.0
Central Highlands 47.6 61.4 59.0 84.0
Southeast 13.7 10.6 11.9 10.1
Mekong Delta 3.2 0.8 0.7 0.2
”Repartition” is the % of all coffee producers in each region
”Concentration” is the % of coffee producers among all farmers in each region
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Table 3: Household characteristics
1993 1998
All Net Net All Net Net
receivers givers receivers givers
N 2807 343 307 2802 460 418
Age 44.6 47.4 45.6 47.4 52.9 46.5
Male % 80.0 66.2 81.1 78.9 68.5 82.5
Education (% primary) 76.5 74.6 73.9 75.8 74.3 71.2
Size 5.1 4.4 5.1 4.9 4.1 4.8
Pre-transfer income 1509.5 1220.6 2081.6 2617.3 1867.2 3669.1
Consumption per cap. 1518.9 1544.3 1840.7 2067.8 2167.2 2543.1
Age dependency ratio 0.42 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.47 0.35
Public assistance 20.2 26.8 25.1 20.7 24.6 27.3
Private insurance 6.4 6.7 11.4 3.3 2.4 3.1
Surface owned 5662.1 4235.3 7055.3 8160.6 4877.9 9117.5
Capital value 210.7 130.7 314.8 448.3 261.7 868.3
Livestock value 1347.2 995.0 1624.4 2224.1 1547.9 2899.2
Shock 0.1 -1.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.1
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Table 4a: Transfer frequencies, 1993
% % % % net % net
involved receiving giving receivers givers
Whole sample 23.0 12.8 12.3 12.0 10.9
North 27.0 15.7 14.2 14.6 12.2
South 17.0 8.7 9.4 8.3 8.8
North Mountains 22.8 10.9 15.0 9.4 13.1
Red River 29.3 17.2 15.2 16.3 12.9
North Central 28.3 18.8 11.8 17.7 10.1
South Central 18.3 11.5 7.5 11.5 6.8
Central Highland 12.5 1.0 12.5 0.0 12.5
Southeast 16.1 8.1 9.3 8.1 9.2
Mekong River 17.5 8.6 10.0 8.0 9.4
Table 4b: Transfer frequencies, 1998
% % % % net % net
involved receiving giving receivers givers
Whole sample 31.6 18.2 17.4 16.4 14.9
North 34.7 19.5 19.6 17.4 16.9
South 26.3 16.0 13.8 14.7 11.5
North Mountains 27.5 12.6 16.3 12.0 15.5
Red River 30.6 19.4 15.5 17.3 13.0
North Central 49.7 28.3 29.6 24.3 24.5
South Central 28.9 20.4 11.2 20.1 8.5
Central Highland 13.8 5.3 8.5 5.3 8.5
Southeast 34.0 15.7 22.6 15.1 18.9
Mekong River 24.7 15.5 13.5 13.3 11.5
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Table 5: Transfer Patterns
1993 1998
Received Transfers
Received: from family (%) 83.6 67.0
Received: young to old (%) 42.5 76.9
Received: old to young (%) 20.4 21.2
% of pre-transfer income (all households) 6.8 9.8
% of pre-transfer income (receivers) 61.2 70.2
Send transfers
Send: to family (%) 84.2 69.5
Send: young to old (%) 44.1 45.7
Send: old to young (%) 23.8 28.5
% of pre-transfer income (all households) 4.1 8.2
% of pre-transfer income (senders) 24.8 35.3
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Table 6: Test for endogeneity of pre-transfer income (Rivers and Vuong, 1988)
Step 1: OLS (Dependent = Pre-transfer income)
1993 1998
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 1.36e+03 2.35e+02 (***) 1.76e+03 5.82e+02 (***)
Education 2.63e+02 4.50e+01 (***) 5.53e+02 7.87e+01 (***)
Gender 5.30e+01 5.23e+01 3.61e+02 9.28e+01 (***)
Age 9.22e+00 9.90e+00 3.70e+01 2.31e+01
Age2 -9.23e-02 1.00e-01 -3.76e-01 2.26e-01
Minority -3.10e+02 5.86e+01 (***) -6.75e+02 1.09e+02 (***)
Size -9.31e+01 1.13e+01 (***) -1.87e+02 2.22e+01 (***)
Age Dependency -6.42e+02 9.52e+01 (***) -1.17e+03 1.73e+02 (***)
Surface Owned 2.97e-02 3.62e-03 (***) 1.66e-03 6.00e-04 (***)
Capital Value 3.31e-01 2.54e-02 (***) 1.25e-01 1.35e-02 (***)
Livestock Value 8.72e-02 1.22e-02 (***) 2.77e-01 1.62e-02 (***)
Public Assistance -5.12e+01 5.10e+01 -3.25e+02 9.09e+01 (***)
Private Insurance 1.47e+01 8.23e+01 6.87e+02 1.95e+02 (***)
Shock 1.18e+01 2.31e+00 (***) 3.20e+00 1.61e+00 (***)
Regional Dummies Yes Yes
R
2 0.26 0.28
Step 2: Probit (Dependent = Net transfer receiver / Net transfer sender)
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
residual vˆ2 (Receiver) 3.27e-04 3.43e-04 3.57e-04 3.36e-04
residual vˆ2 (Giver) -1.51e-03 1.14e-03 9.50e-04 1.18e-03
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Table 7a: Parametric results: Linear model for net receivers
Linear Model (OLS)
Dependent: Net receiver of transfers
1993 1998
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 4.10e-01 7.31e-02 (***) 4.07e-01 1.10e-01 (***)
Gender -8.96e-02 1.61e-02 (***) -4.71e-02 1.74e-02 (***)
Size -1.36e-02 3.51e-03 (***) -2.62e-02 4.22e-03 (***)
Income -5.44e-05 1.19e-05 (***) -6.38e-05 7.76e-06 (***)
Income2 4.60e-09 1.66e-09 (***) 3.93e-09 6.60e-10 (***)
Education 5.12e-02 1.40e-02 (***) 3.99e-02 1.49e-02 (***)
Surface owned 7.48e-07 1.12e-06 3.33e-08 1.12e-07
Capital value 4.26e-06 8.14e-06 -3.92e-06 3.43e-06
Livestock value -4.36e-06 3.82e-06 -2.68e-06 2.59e-06
Minority -3.09e-02 1.82e-02 (**) -5.07e-02 2.07e-02 (**)
Age -1.09e-02 3.04e-03 (***) -7.50e-03 4.35e-03 (*)
Age2 1.38e-04 3.09e-05 (***) 1.22e-04 4.26e-05 (***)
Age dependency 9.24e-02 2.96e-02 (***) 1.67e-01 3.29e-02 (***)
Public assistance 2.24e-02 1.57e-02 -1.15e-02 1.71e-02
Private insurance 1.39e-02 2.53e-02 -2.32e-02 3.68e-02
Regional dummies Yes Yes
R
2
.078 .125
Table 7b: Parametric results: Non-linear model for net receivers
Non-linear Model (Probit)
Dependent: Net receiver of transfers
1993 1998
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 2.13e-01 3.78e-01 9.53e-02 4.90e-01
Gender -4.08e-01 7.99e-02 (***) -1.99e-01 7.55e-02 (***)
Size -7.02e-02 2.04e-02 (***) -9.75e-02 1.97e-02 (***)
Income -2.68e-04 6.38e-05 (***) -2.83e-04 3.77e-05 (***)
Income2 2.13e-08 8.49e-09 (**) 1.69e-08 3.17e-09 (***)
Education 2.66e-01 7.42e-02 (***) 1.79e-01 6.83e-02 (***)
Surface owned 2.31e-06 6.95e-06 -7.80e-08 1.06e-06
Capital value 1.65e-05 5.49e-05 -1.98e-05 1.88e-05
Livestock value -2.90e-05 2.57e-05 -2.33e-05 1.50e-05
Minority -1.79e-01 1.09e-01 -2.32e-01 1.02e-01 (**)
Age -5.14e-02 1.56e-02 (***) -2.99e-02 1.91e-02
Age2 6.27e-04 1.57e-04 (***) 4.53e-04 1.85e-04 (**)
Age dependency 3.23e-01 1.50e-01 (**) 4.85e-01 1.43e-01 (***)
Public assistance 1.16e-01 8.07e-02 -3.89e-02 7.75e-02
Private insurance 8.02e-02 1.33e-01 -1.47e-01 -1.47e-01
Regional dummies Yes Yes
% Correct Pred. 88.1 84.8
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Table 8a: Parametric results: Linear model for net givers
Linear Model (OLS)
Dependent: Net giver of transfers
1993 1998
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept -1.13e-01 7.06e-02 -2.83e-01 1.08e-01 (***)
Gender 5.95e-04 1.55e-02 8.13e-03 1.71e-02
Size -2.69e-03 3.39e-03 -4.51e-03 4.14e-03
Income 5.72e-05 1.15e-05 (***) 5.45e-05 7.62e-06 (***)
Income2 -2.82e-09 1.60e-09 (*) 7.62e-06 6.48e-10 (***)
Education 3.31e-02 1.35e-02 (**) 4.26e-02 1.46e-02 (***)
Surface owned 2.93e-06 1.08e-06 (***) -6.92e-08 1.10e-07
Capital value -4.97e-06 7.86e-06 6.36e-06 3.37e-06 (*)
Livestock value 2.10e-06 3.69e-06 5.69e-06 2.54e-06 (**)
Minority -2.83e-02 1.75e-02 -9.87e-03 2.04e-02
Age 6.54e-03 2.93e-03 (**) 1.23e-02 4.27e-03 (***)
Age2 -6.13e-05 -6.13e-05 (**) -1.26e-04 4.18e-05 (***)
Age dependency -3.11e-02 2.86e-02 1.43e-02 3.23e-02
Public assistance 1.08e-02 1.51e-02 5.72e-02 1.68e-02 (***)
Private insurance 6.25e-02 2.44e-02 (**) -7.17e-02 3.61e-02 (**)
Regional dummies Yes Yes
R
2
.053 .087
Table 8b: Parametric results: Non-linear model for net givers
Non-linear Model (Probit)
Dependent: Net giver of transfers
1993 1998
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept -2.63e+00 4.38e-01 (***) -3.47e+00 5.85e-01 (***)
Gender -2.18e-05 8.97e-02 4.23e-02 8.46e-02
Size -1.66e-02 2.07e-02 -1.89e-02 2.13e-02
Income 2.07e-02 6.31e-05 (***) 2.60e-04 3.73e-05 (***)
Income2 -2.17e-08 8.25e-09 (***) -1.09e-08 2.92e-09 (***)
Education 1.92e-01 7.62e-02 (**) 2.05e-01 6.93e-02 (***)
Surface owned 1.29e-05 5.35e-06 (**) -3.33e-07 6.60e-07
Capital value -1.80e-05 3.79e-05 3.33e-05 2.35e-05
Livestock value 1.66e-05 1.92e-05 2.09e-05 1.10e-05
Minority -1.86e-01 1.03e-01 (*) -7.23e-02 1.02e-01
Age 4.29e-02 1.86e-02 (**) 7.36e-02 2.34e-02 (***)
Age2 -4.20e-04 1.91e-04 (**) -7.69e-04 2.32e-04 (***)
Age dependency -1.80e-01 1.68e-01 8.65e-02 1.63e-01
Public assistance 3.51e-02 8.38e-02 2.34e-01 7.79e-02 (***)
Private insurance 2.69e-01 1.20e-01 (**) -3.21e-01 1.77e-01 (*)
Regional dummies Yes Yes
% Correct Pred. 88.1 81.5
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Figures
Figure 1: Income vs Consumption
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Figure 2: Pre-Transfer Income and Participation in Transfers
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Figure 3a: Coffee prices (New York market)
Figure 3b: Robusta prices (London market)
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Figure 4: Income Structure, 1993
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Figure 5: Income Structure, 1998
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Figure 6: Distribution of shocks to the production function
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Figure 7: Predicted probabilities of receiving transfers (probit model)
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Predicted Probability of Receiving Transfers vs Income
[1998]
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Predicted Probability of Receiving Transfers vs Age
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Figure 8: Predicted probabilities of sending transfers (probit model)
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Predicted Probability of Sending Transfers vs Age
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Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of receiving transfers (Klein-Spady model)
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Figure 10: Predicted probabilities of sending transfers (Klein-Spady model)
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Figure 11: Parametric vs Semiparametric predicted probabilities
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Annex 1: Income calculation details
• Land payments:
– payments received from rent (+)
– payments made to use owned land (-)
– payments made to use rented land (-)
• Agricultural income:
– Crop
– By-products
– Home-production
– Livestock
– Water product
– Lease of farming equipment
• Non-farm self-employment (income from family )
• Wage income
• Other income
– Private transfers
– Scolarship
– Pensions
– Subsidies
– Interest on savings, loans
– Private insurance
– Gifts
– Inheritance
– Lottery gains
– Lease of building
– Lease of machines
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